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Abstract 
 
The article discovers problems of imperfection and an inefficiency of the contractual relations in agrarian sector of Russian 
regions, which undermine the bases of regional food security. Moreover, in the conditions of sanctions and new economic and 
political threats agrarian complex development has the biggest priority among economic tasks Russia’s facing. Finally, the level 
of food security is determined by the peculiarities of subjects’ behavior in agrarian sector. As for these subjects we mean 
farmers, manufacturers, merchandisers, consumers and the government. In this article we introduce the evaluation technique 
of regional food security level. As for two key conditions of food security we consider, first of all, price affordability of key food 
products and, the second, sufficiency of its consumption. Under developed technique we analysed the food security’ condition 
in Chelyabinsk Region (Russia). In the end of the article we develop a number of the models showing the roots of imperfection 
of the contractual relations in agrarian sector. 
 
Keywords: agrarian sector, agrarian policy, government regulation of agriculture, food security, contractual relations’ efficiency, 
elasticity of contractual relations’ efficiency.  
 
 
 Introduction 1.
 
Contractual relations are the dominating form of any economic relations in modern business. The problems of Russian 
agrarian sector are especially actual nowadays. The last months were marked by the abrupt growth of political and 
economic risks. The sanctions of European Union and USA put over Russian subjects, led to growth of loan capital’s 
cost. In connection with this sanctions Russia has to keep economic and social stability. In order to withstand the 
aggressive pressure of international environment, our country, its regions and municipalities, have to achieve a 
sustainable development of all economic sectors. The agrarian sector is strategically significant for Russian economy. 
According to the experts, approximately 8,5% of gross domestic product is produced in this sector, 3,4% of basic assets 
is concentrated, more than 11% of all employee are occupied (Skrynnik, 2010).  
There are three objectives of our research: 
- to develop the evaluation technique of regional food security level; 
- to analyse and estimate the condition of agrarian sector in Chelyabinsk Region; 
- to construct a number of models of contractual relations’ efficiency. 
As for subjects of the contractual relations we mean the following faces: farmers, manufacturers, merchandisers, 
consumers and the government (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The subjects of the contractual relations in agrarian sector. 
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As for the contractual relations in agrarian sector we mean a special sort of the economic relations between, at least, two 
subjects concerning purchase and sale of foodstuff on the basis of developed institutes’ system.  
As for essential characteristics of the contractual relations we indicate the following: 
- there is an object of property rights transfer;  
- there are at least two subjects; 
- there is a mechanism of constraint to satisfy an agreement. 
We define contractual relations’ efficiency in agrarian chain as ability of these relations to satisfy economic 
interests of its relations’ subjects. These relations base on distribution of ultimate agricultural product’s price. In other 
words, maximizing efficiency of the contractual relations implies the determination of optimum price – such price which 
harmonizes interaction between four subjects mentioned. 
Considering the problem of contractual relations’ efficiency, we use the method of a dichotomy and divide all 
contractual relations into perfect and imperfect. The contractual relations in regional agrarian sector will be perfect if 
maximum level of regional food security is reached. 
As criteria of regional food security level we accept implementation of the following two conditions: 
- sufficiency of key foodstuff consumption: 
- price affordability. 
Thus, if two mentioned conditions are reached, we can call the contractual relations in regional agrarian sector 
perfect or effective ones. If at least one of two mentioned conditions isn't satisfied, the efficiency of the contractual 
relations along with a condition of food security will be insufficient. And, at last, if none of two conditions is satisfied, we 
can say about extremely negative level of regional food security. 
 
 Research Methodology  2.
 
 An assessment of contractual relations’ quality, first of all, has to provide possibilities of assessment of food security 
condition. For an assessment of regional food security condition we use two coefficients: 
K1 – the coefficient of sufficiency of key foodstuff consumption; 
K2 – the coefficient of price affordability. 
The first coefficient (K1) is the sum of ratios the actual consumption of each product (Qia) to standard consumption 
of corresponding product (Qis): 
,                                                                    (1) 
where Qia – actual consumption of i-product, 
Qis – standard consumption of i-product, 
n – quantity of products in consumer’ food basket. 
Standards of consumption are established with a glance of regional climatic features  and are calculated for able-
bodied population. Standards of consumption of key food products are defined by the Concept of the food security of Ural 
Federal District for the period till 2020 [2], developed within the Doctrine of food security of Russian Federation for the 
period till 2020 [3]. The recommended standards of consumption are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Quantities of standard consumption of key food products in Ural Federal District 
 
ʋ Sorts of food products The recommended standards of annual consumption, kg per capita 
1 Meat and meat foods 75
2 Milk and dairy foods 305
3 Eggs (pcs.) 250
4 Bread 105
5 Potato 100
6 Vegetable and cucurbitaceous products 150
 
The source: the Doctrine of food security of Russian Federation (2010 – 2020). The access: http://www.kremlin. 
ru/news/6752 
For calculation of coefficient K1 we add a number of simplifications:  
1) as the Concept of food security of Ural Federal District (2010 – 2020) offers standards only for six food 
products, we will recognize that all consumer’s food basket consists of six products mentioned in Table 1; 
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2) let’s consider that the quantities of the actual consumption can't exceed the recommended standard, otherwise 
the buyer consumes excessive quantity of the product that doesn't influence food security in any way. 
Based on the first simplification, we transform the Formula (1) as follows: 
,                 (2) 
Numeration of products in the Formula (2) corresponds to number of products mentioned in Table 1. 
Relying on the second simplification, we come at a conclusion that the coefficient of sufficiency of consumption K1 
will vary from 0 to 6. 
For calculation of coefficient of price accessibility K2 we will use the following formula: 
,                                                             (3) 
where ɋis – consumer expenses on standard quantity of i-product, 
AI – weight-average income per capita, 
n – quantity of products in consumer’ food basket. 
The calculation of coefficient K2 is based on following simplifications: 
1) we will consider not actual expenses, but expenses on standard quantity in coefficient numerator. Otherwise 
calculation of this coefficient loses sense; 
2) the consumer’ food basket consists of six products mentioned in Table 1. 
Based on mentioned simplification, we transform the Formula (3) as follows: 
,                        (4) 
where ɋis – consumer expenses on standard quantity of i-product according to numeration of products in Table 1  
The coefficient K2 theoretically can vary from zero to infinity. However, in practice this coefficient has finite value. If 
the coefficient K2 has value below 10%, we consider a situation with regional food security perfect. As acceptable level 
we’ll take range from 10% to 20%. Let’s call an interval from 20% to 30% a satisfactory condition of food security. Thus, 
we’ll take value of 30% for the critical level of coefficient K2. If the share of consumer’ expenses on food products 
exceeds 30%, it makes an unsatisfactory condition of regional food security. 
The matrix presented in Table 2 allows us to make a final conclusion on the condition of regional food security. 
 
Table 2. Matrix, allowed evaluating the condition of regional food security 
 
 Ʉ1[0 – 3] (3 – 4] (4 – 5] (5 – 6] 
Ʉ2 
Below 10% Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Acceptable Perfect 
[10% – 20%) Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Acceptable Acceptable 
[20% – 30%] Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory 
Over 30% Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory 
 
The Source: Developed by authors. 
 
 Main Body. Results. 3.
 
In this part of the article we evaluate the condition of food security in Chelyabinsk Region. The quantities of consumption 
of the main food products per capita are specified in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. The quantities of consumption of the main food products, kg per capita 
 
ʋ Sorts of food products Period2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 Meat and meat foods 66,3 69,5 74,5 70,5 77,0 78,1 80,5 83,4 83,6 
2 Milk and dairy foods 231,1 246,2 241,2 236,5 257,8 249,8 248,3 252,0 254,4 
3 Eggs (pcs.) 210 179 173 174 193 187 187 184 185 
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4 Bread 96,5 95,9 94,0 87,7 89,7 88,9 86,6 84,3 85,3 
5 Potato 58,5 59,2 59,7 57,0 55,7 54,3 54,5 48,7 49,9 
6 Vegetable and cucurbitaceous products 73,6 78,5 82,1 98,0 94,9 102,1 116,9 104,9 105,8 
 
The Source: According to selective researches. 
 
To calculate the coefficient K1 (Formula 2) we use data from Table 3. The results are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. The coefficient of sufficiency of key foodstuff consumption (Ʉ1) 
 
ʋ Sorts of food products Period2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 Meat and meat foods 0,88 0,93 0,99 0,94 1,03 1,04 1,07 1,11 1,11 
2 Milk and dairy foods 0,76 0,81 0,79 0,78 0,85 0,82 0,81 0,83 0,83 
3 Eggs (pcs.) 0,84 0,72 0,69 0,70 0,77 0,75 0,75 0,74 0,74 
4 Bread 0,92 0,91 0,90 0,84 0,85 0,85 0,82 0,80 0,81 
5 Potato 0,59 0,59 0,60 0,57 0,56 0,54 0,55 0,49 0,50 
6 Vegetable and cucurbitaceous products 0,49 0,52 0,55 0,65 0,63 0,68 0,78 0,70 0,71 
The coefficient (Ʉ1) 4,48 4,48 4,52 4,47 4,66 4,64 4,71 4,55 4,60 
 
The Source: Evaluated by authors. 
 
Table 4 shows that the coefficient Ʉ1 has no high volatility in the course of time. It constantly remains in the range from 4 
to 5 units that points to a satisfactory condition of food security. However, considering the greatest possible value of 
coefficient (6 units), it is possible to make a conclusion that it is still far to an excellent condition of regional food security. 
For end-to-end assessment we should calculate the coefficient Ʉ2. For calculation of this coefficient according 
formula 3 or we should calculate the weight-average income per capita (a coefficient denominator). There is a question of 
selection: if we calculate the coefficient for employed persons, we will take a salary into account. We’ll consider that the 
population has no other income, except a salary, or they are extremely insignificant. If as selection we take all population 
of Chelyabinsk Region, we should consider along with employees also unemployed residents. 
At first we’ll go on the first way. Data for January, 2015 about the average number of workers and their average 
earnings by types of economic activity are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Data about the average number of workers and their average earnings by types of economic activity 
 
ʋ The contingent of workers by types of economic activity The average numbers of workers 
The average 
earnings, rubles 
1 Agriculture, hunting and forestry 29 611 18 242 
2 Fishery, fish breeding 344 16 795 
3 Mining operations 19 942 29 541 
4 Manufacturing industry 311 474 28 964 
5 Power generation and electrical energy distribution. Production and distribution of gas and water 41 364 33 400 
6 Building 49 858 27 741 
7 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of vehicles, motorcycles, household products and subjects of private use 111 633 26 340 
8 Hotels and restaurants 14 220 20 669 
9 Transport and communication 83 723 29 011 
10 Financial activities 21 309 35 755 
11 Operations with real estate, rent and rendering of services 92 031 30 983 
12 Public administration and ensuring military safety, social insurance 76 343 30 039 
13 Education 130 484 19 500 
14 Health care and providing social services 101 845 22 806 
15 Providing other municipal, social and personal services 34 300 26 007 
ɂɌɈȽɈ: 1 118 481
 
The Source: According to website http://chelstat.gks.ru. 
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After calculating the weight-average income per capita based of data in Table 5, we received value of 27045,77 rubles. 
To calculate the numerator of coefficient K2 (Formula 4) we should estimate the level of prices for each food product. The 
average prices of six key food products are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Food prices in Chelyabinsk region (March, 2015). 
 
ʋ Sorts of food products Prices, rubles per kilo 
1 Meat and meat foods 298
2 Milk and dairy foods 46,7
3 Eggs (per 10 pcs.) 61,9
4 Bread 53,2
5 Potato 30,9
6 Vegetable and cucurbitaceous products 37,2
 
The Source: According to website http://chelstat.gks.ru. 
 
Let’s estimate the annual cost of a consumer basket from six specified products based on standard quantities of 
consumption: 
. 
In calculation of monthly expenses this sum will be at the level of 4366,41 rubles. 
Thus, calculation of coefficient K2 will lead the following result: 
 
If in the denominator we consider not earnings of employed persons, but the average income per capita of all 
inhabitants of Chelyabinsk region, calculation coefficient K2 will be following: 
 
For summing up we use the matrix represented in Table 2. The results of calculation coefficient K2 over the working 
persons (1) and overall population of Chelyabinsk Region (2) are shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. The results of an assessment of food security’ condition in Chelyabinsk Region 
 
 Ʉ1[0 – 3] (3 – 4] (4 – 5] (5 – 6] 
Ʉ2 
Below 10%  
[10% – 20%) Acceptable (1)  
[20% – 30%] Satisfactory (2)  
Over 30%  
 
Thus, we can make a conclusion about acceptable or satisfactory condition of food security in Chelyabinsk region. 
Today the problem of contractual relations’ efficiency in agrarian chain (figure 2) is actually reduced to the analysis 
of efficiency of interaction among four subjects: farmers (1), manufacturers (2), merchandisers (3) and the ultimate 
consumer (4). 
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Figure 2. Contract interactions between subjects of an agrarian chain 
 
Let’s consider that the purpose function of the first three subjects is maximizing selling price (P1, P2, P3), and the purpose 
function of the consumer is maximizing the utility (U3) from a product. 
On Figure 2 we can see the factors of contractual relations’ efficiency: for subjects 1 – 3 selling prices (P1, P2, P3) 
are the factors of efficiency growth, and their expenses (S1, S2, S3) are the factors of efficiency decrease. For the 
consumer there is another situation: the higher price of a product (P3), the lower contractual efficiency for consumer, as 
his utility (U3) decreases. 
Let’s suppose that each of three subjects (the farmer, the manufacturer, the merchandiser) has his own function of 
contractual relations’ efficiency (E) showing dependence on selling price (P): 
, 
where Ei – contractual relations’ efficiency for i-subject, 
Pi – release price for i-subject, 
i – 1, 2, 3,4. 
At first we construct functions of contractual relations efficiency for the first three subjects of an agrarian chain. 
Taking into attention the positive dependence of contractual relations efficiency on the price the general view of function 
will look like: 
, 
where ki – the price elasticity coefficient of contractual relations efficiency for i-person. 
The price elasticity of contractual relations efficiency for i-person for three subjects researched firmly depends on 
cost price growth rate of cost price (ǻSi): 
, 
where Si – level of cost price for i-person. 
Graphically dependence of contractual relations efficiency of subjects 1 – 3 of selling price is reflected in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The curve of contractual relations efficiency for farmers (E1), manufactures (E2), merchandisers (E3), total 
efficiency (E), 
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The gradient angles Į1, Į2, Į3, demonstrate the three subjects’ price elasticity of contractual relations efficiency: 
 
The factor of costs is the key for price elasticity of contractual relations efficiency. 
Let’s summarize curves of contractual relations efficiency (E1, E2, E3) vertically. In that way total efficiency will be 
reflected by curve E. 
The ultimate consumer also has his own efficiency curve of contract relations efficiency (E4). Peculiarity of this 
curve is its negative slope (Figure 4). The lower price of consumption the higher his satisfaction. This idea is also 
reflected by the curve of contractual relations efficiency (E4): 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The curve of contractual relations efficiency for ultimate consumer (E4) 
 
Similar to the situation represented in Figure 2, gradient angles Į, Į’ show elasticity of contractual relations efficiency for 
the ultimate consumer: 
  
The key factor of price elasticity of contractual relations efficiency for consumer is his utility. Product utility reflects 
importance of goods for consumer. The researched elasticity is derivative from elasticity of demand for food products. 
Let’s determine a total curve of contractual relations efficiency of all subjects researched (TE). The total curve can 
be received by addition of two curves (E1-3 and E4). The Figure 5 shows the total curve of contractual relations efficiency 
(TE). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The total curve (TE) of contractual relations efficiency for all the subjects of contractual relations  
 
If we take into account elasticity of contractual relations efficiency, we can displace the curve E1-3, and then we can 
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construct a new curve of total efficiency TE1 (Figure 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Shift of total curve of contractual relations efficiency (TE) as a result of any factor’s impact on elasticity of the 
curve E1-3 
 
If we take into account that elasticity of contractual relations efficiency for consumer changes, this factor displaces curve 
E4. The Figure 7 shows new total curve of contractual relations efficiency TE2. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Shift of total curve of contractual relations efficiency (TE) as a result of any factor’s impact on elasticity of the 
curve E4. 
 
 Discussions 4.
 
The problem of the contractual relations is the new one in economic science. The theory of contracts gained the 
distribution within new institutional school. However, scientists paid attention to the problem of food security a long time 
ago. Still physiocrats, led by F. Quesnay, assume that the main source of wealth is agriculture. Work in this sphere of 
agriculture they called productive unlike any other "sterile" work.  
The surplus product is created directly by work of farmers and provides welfare for all society, thus, the central 
sector of any economy is agrarian(Quesnay, 1972). Malthus, T was the first economist who pointed at danger of 
overpopulation in the Earth taking into account the law of the decreasing productiveness of soil (Malthus, 1820). He 
pointed at necessity of marriage regulations and birth rate regulation. 
As for present time, the end of the XX century was marked by unprecedented growth of planet population, 
especially in developing countries that caused numerous energy crises and environmental problems. 
Conway, G. and Barber, E. define food security as the guaranteed access for all inhabitants to food products 
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enough for healthy and active life at any time. And, according to some researchers, the major factor limiting this access is 
inaccessibility of energy, especially it concerns developing countries. The authors, mentioned above, see the solution in 
the state policy directed to support agro-industrial complex, fight against poverty and birth rate regulation (ɋonway, 
Barber , 1990)  
According to Gorbacheva, A. and Kupchenko, A, the food security can be characterized as ability of a country to 
produce enough of food. Thus, food has to be of satisfactory qualitaty and safe for life and health of the population. The 
government has to pay more attention to low-income population (Gorbacheva A.A., Kupchenko A.Ju, , 2013). These 
authors mark out the following components of food security: 1) physical availability of food; 2) economic availability of 
food; 3) safety and quality of the food. 
When Mikhaylushkin, P and Barannikova, A determine food security they point at negative influence of external 
factors. Even in the conditions of political and economic risks the government has to ensure food security (Mihajlushkin 
P.V., Barannikov A.A, 2013)]. 
As for Russian scientists, nobody researches the contractual relations efficiency in agrarian sector. The new 
institutional theory of contracts becomes widespread in the 1970’s. For example, Macneil, I. became the first who gave 
classification of contracts. He determined contracts as mini-societies with the extensive range of norms which aren't 
limited by those, from which are directly connected with the act of an exchange" (Campbell D, 2004) Macneil’s 
classification marks off the contractual relations on classical, neoclassical and relational. Discrecity, comprehensiveness 
of agreements and transparency of all future circumstances are characteristics of the classical contract. As for classical 
contract the formal clauses come out on top. As usually, classical contract is short-term contract. Long-term contracts are 
characterized by uncertainty. Such contracts are not transparent. Macneil, I. called such contracts neoclassical. 
Neoclassical contracts are connected with incompleteness of any agreement. 
Williamson, O. constructed types of management of the contractual relations and considered questions of 
opportunism as well as economy of transactional expenses (Williamson O, 1979). 
The special approach of Hodgson, G. to contractual relations is following: he connects them with transfer of 
property rights, and not just with a bipartite transfer of goods, services or money between agents (Hodgson G, 1988). 
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. focused attention on such factors of contractual relations efficiency as asymmetry of 
information and behavioral opportunism (Jensen, 1976). These factors also result in incompleteness of contract spoken 
by Hart, O. (Hart., Moore, 1988) 
As for Russian scientists Auzan, A., Bendukidze, K., Benz, D., Kozlova, E., Kudryashova, E., Kuzminov, Y., 
Oleynik, A., Popov, E., Silova, E., Tambovtsev, V., Shastitko, A. and Yudkevich, M. research problems of contractual 
relations efficiency. For example, Benz, D., Kozlova, E., Silova, E. show interconnection between opportunism, quality of 
corporate institutes and imperfection of contractual relations (Benz, D.S., E.V. Kozlova and E.S. Silova, 2014) 
In this article we touch upon a question of contractual relations imperfection in agrarian sector. This article shows 
our attempt to unite new institutional approach to the contractual relations imperfection with a problem of regional food 
security. 
 
 Conclusion 5.
 
Today, one of the most actual problems of Russian economy is the problem of food security. Among key problems we 
can find the following: 
- the advancing growth rate of food prices in comparison with growth rate of the population’s income leads to 
growth of share of consumer’s expenses on products in their total income; 
- poor quality of some food products influences health and life expectancy of population; 
- low efficiency of some agricultural enterprises, including insufficient financial stability, low labor productivity, 
lack of investments, technological lag. 
The key reason of contractual relations imperfection in Russian agrarian is low competition among landowners. In 
view of the import embargo on the food from abroad Russian agro-industrial companies and the merchandisers 
understand essential decrease in the competition today. Therefore, absence of stimuli to expand quantities of production 
and to rise quality level reduces all economic efficiency. Absence of access for companies to the cheap credits for 
expansion of its production plays a negative role for all agrarian sector. 
Summing up the results, we can point at the key problem of Russian agrarian policy. There is lack of agreement 
between participants of the agricultural market. Notably, consumers have to buy the extremely expensive product while 
the farmer, being the first subject in agrarian chain, sometimes realizes the production even at a loss. That’s why we can 
see inefficient redistribution which leads to low contractual relations efficiency. The underdevelopment of institutional 
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forms of interaction between subjects mentioned dictates necessity of the government’s intervention. The constructed 
graphic models of contractual relations efficiency will help to make detailed research in the field of development of the 
mechanism of the government support of agriculture. 
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